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OPINION OF THE COURT
                             
MICHEL, Circuit Judge
 
Plaintiff Unalachtigo Band of Nanticoke-Lenni Lenape
Nation (“Unalachtigo”) filed a complaint in District Court,
based on the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 187, seeking
possession of land in New Jersey that previously constituted the
Brotherton Indian reservation.  Intervenor-appellant
Stockbridge-Munsee Community (“Stockbridge”) moved to
dismiss Unalachtigo’s complaint under Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming a non-frivolous interest in
the property.  In a single order, the District Court dismissed
Unalachtigo’s complaint sua sponte for lack of standing and also
denied Stockbridge’s Rule 19 motion to dismiss, finding that
Stockbridge did not have a non-frivolous interest in the property
because it had failed to demonstrate that it was a successor-in-
interest to the Brotherton Indians.  Stockbridge appeals to this
5court, arguing that the District Court opinion should be vacated
because that court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Stockbridge’s
motion once it determined that Unalachtigo’s complaint should
be dismissed for lack of standing.  We agree with Stockbridge
and will vacate-in-part the portion of the District Court’s order
and opinion denying Stockbridge’s Rule 19 motion. 
I. 
During the French and Indian War, the Colonies faced
enemies in the form of France and its Delaware Indian allies,
some of whom had migrated west from New Jersey decades
earlier.  Within the Colony of New Jersey, small bands of
Delaware Indians remained.  Fearing an alliance between those
remaining Delaware Indians and those to the west, New Jersey
entered into a treaty with those remaining Delawares in 1758.
In return for giving up their claims to lands, the Delaware
Indians who wished to remain in New Jersey were settled on a
reservation called Brotherton, in an area that today is located
within Shamong Township. These Indians formed a tribal
government known as the Brotherton Indians. A f t e r  t h e
French and Indian War ended, New Jersey grew less concerned
about the welfare of the Brotherton Indians.  Government
financial assistance was withdrawn, and in 1801 the poverty-
stricken tribe asked the State of New Jersey to sell its
reservation and help it move to central New York, where the
Mohican Indians on the New Stockbridge reservation had
invited them to live.  The State legislature obliged, and the
6majority of the Brotherton moved to New York, where State
agents ensured that the formal merger agreement between the
Stockbridge and Brotherton tribes granted full membership
rights to the Brotherton Delaware.  The State then sold the
reservation and held the proceeds, which the combined tribe
later used to purchase land in Wisconsin after it was forced out
of New York in the 1820s and 30s.
In 1823, the Brothertons and Stockbridge again executed
a formal tribal agreement to ensure they would receive equal
right in the newly purchased Wisconsin lands.  In 1832, the
Stockbridge Brothertons appeared before the New Jersey
legislature seeking compensation for off-reservation treaty
hunting and fishing rights not included in the 1802 cession.  The
legislature appropriated $2,000 and the Indians signed a transfer
agreement, purportedly relinquishing the last of Brotherton’s
tribal rights in New Jersey.
According to Stockbridge, New Jersey’s purchase of the
Brotherton reservation did not comply with federal law.  Since
1789, federal law has required Congress to approve the sale of
any Indian lands.  Because the State failed to get Congressional
approval, the 1801 sale violated federal law and failed to
extinguish Indian property rights in the tract.  
In the 1990s, a tribe of Delaware Indians in Oklahoma
sought to pursue this claim.  It asked the legal office for the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), as its trustee, to develop and
7prosecute the claim on its behalf.  The federal lawyers, with the
help of a BIA historian, investigated the history of the
Brotherton reservation and concluded that, while there probably
was a meritorious claim to be pursued, this tribe of Delawares
from Oklahoma was not the one to do it because it was not the
successor-in-interest to the Brotherton Delaware Tribe.  Instead,
it appeared that the Stockbridge-Munsee Tribe (the intervenor-
appellant “Stockbridge”) in Wisconsin was the likely successor
and, in 2000, the Interior Department’s top Indian-affairs lawyer
advised Stockbridge of its potential claim.  Stockbridge then
retained counsel and an expert historian to investigate the claim.
Before Stockbridge acted on its claim, the Unalachtigo,
an Indian group in southern New Jersey not recognized by the
United States or the State of New Jersey, filed this 2005 action
claiming to be the rightful owners of the Brotherton reservation
and seeking its possession.  Asserting its claim through the
Nonintercourse Act (“Act”), the Unalachtigo alleged that New
Jersey’s sale of the reservation in 1802 violated the Act because
the sale of Indian lands is void if it is without Congressional
consent.
 Stockbridge determined that this suit likely would result
in judicial interpretation of the same treaties and statutes that
should necessarily form the basis of its own claim if it later
decided to pursue it.  But Stockbridge did not want to litigate
these matters in the context of the Unalachtigo suit.  Concerned
that its interests could be impaired if the action proceeded in its
8absence, Stockbridge moved to intervene as a defendant for the
sole purpose of seeking dismissal of the Unalachtigo’s
complaint under Rule 19 for failure to join it as an indispensable
party claiming sovereign immunity.  Stockbridge claimed that it
was the successor-in-interest to the Brotherton Indians.
However, it did not claim an interest in the land of the
Brotherton reservation or otherwise move to address its interests
on the merits.
Before the District Court rendered a decision on
Stockbridge’s Rule 19 motion, Unalachtigo amended the
Complaint to name the State of New Jersey and Governor Jon S.
Corzine (“State defendants”) and dismissed as to the other,
Burlington County defendants.  The State defendants filed a
motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity as
well as other defenses.  The State defendants later withdrew
their motion to dismiss without prejudice for the District Court
to resolve Stockbridge’s motion.  
On May 20, 2008, the District Court denied
Stockbridge’s motion under Rule 19 and dismissed
Unalachtigo’s case for lack of standing sua sponte.  Both
Unalachtigo and Stockbridge appealed the court’s order.
Unalachtigo was unable to obtain counsel and its appeal was
therefore dismissed.
In its opening brief, Stockbridge did not challenge the
District Court’s dismissal of Unalachtigo’s complaint, but
9instead requested that this court reverse the District Court’s
ruling that, because Stockbridge is not Brotherton’s successor,
it was not an indispensable party pursuant to Rule 19(a).
Stockbridge argued that it was the successor-in-interest to the
Brotherton.  In response, the State of New Jersey argued that the
decision should be affirmed because there was no case or
controversy as a result of the dismissal of Unalachtigo’s
amended complaint.  On reply, Stockbridge abandons its
original argument that the District Court erred in denying its
Rule 19 motion.  Stockbridge instead argues that the District
Court opinion should be vacated because the District Court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the Rule 19 motion once it
determined that Unalachtigo’s complaint should be dismissed
for lack of standing.  
II.
Article III extends the Judicial Power of the United States
only to “cases” and “controversies.”  The Supreme Court has
held that “federal courts are without power to decide questions
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.”
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).  As the
Supreme Court emphasized, “Without jurisdiction the court
cannot proceed at all in any cause.  Jurisdiction is power to
declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause.”  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In New Jersey v. Heldor Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 702, 705
(3d Cir. 1993), this court vacated an opinion entered by a lower
court after it lost jurisdiction.  The State of New Jersey initially
objected to Heldor’s bankruptcy settlement agreement, but later
advised the bankruptcy judge that it would withdraw its
objection.  Id. at 704.  Despite being aware of the withdrawal,
the bankruptcy judge still issued a memorandum opinion
concluding that the State’s objection was overruled.  See id. at
704-05.  After the District Court affirmed the bankruptcy
judge’s opinion, Heldor appealed to this court, arguing that the
bankruptcy judge lacked the jurisdiction to issue its opinion.
See id. at 705.  This court agreed, reasoning, “[s]ince from the
time of the Framers to the present federal courts have been
limited in their power to decide only ‘cases’ or ‘controversies’
and not render advisory opinions, it is apparent that the
bankruptcy judge could not exercise ‘the judicial Power of the
United States’ over a non-existent dispute[.]” Id. at 709.  The
controversy was moot after the State’s withdrawal of its
objection and, thus, the bankruptcy judge’s memorandum was
an improper “advisory” opinion.  See id. at 707.
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the issue similarly in
Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Pacific
Lumber Co., 257 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2001).  In that case, the
appellant asked the Ninth Circuit to vacate an order, filed after
the case had become moot, outlining the District Court’s reasons
for granting a preliminary injunction.  Id. at 1073. The appellee
agreed that the District Court lost jurisdiction, but argued that
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the appellant lacked standing to appeal because the final
judgment was in the appellant’s favor.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that the appeal “d[id] not qualify for prudential
standing in the most used settings (reformation of judgment,
future economic loss or collateral estoppel)[.]”  Id. at 1076.
Nevertheless, the court, like the majority in Heldor, held that the
District Court’s decision to “flout the dictates of Article III and
render an opinion in spite of knowing the cause was moot did
render [the appellant] an ‘aggrieved party.’” Id. at 1077.  The
court explained, “[w]hile it is true that all dicta ‘have no
preclusive effect,’ dicta entered after a court has lost jurisdiction
over a party inflicts a wrong on that party of a different order
than that which exists in the usual case of extraneous judicial
pronouncement.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  The Ninth
Circuit therefore vacated the District Court’s order and
remanded.  Id. 
In this case, the District Court dismissed Unalachtigo’s
amended complaint for lack of standing.  Because intervention
is ancillary to a main cause, once the District Court determined
that Unalachtigo’s cause of action should be dismissed for lack
of standing, there no longer was a live case or controversy.  See
Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 328 (3d Cir. 1965) (holding that
intervention contemplates an existing suit and is ancillary to the
main cause of action); see also Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d
673, 677 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]ntervention is ancillary and
subordinate to a main cause and whenever an action is
terminated, for whatever reason, there no longer remains an
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action in which there can be an intervention.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, as in Heldor and Pacific
Lumber, the District Court issued an opinion on Stockbridge’s
Rule 19 motion when it lacked jurisdiction.  This “advisory”
opinion ignores the dictates of Article III and renders
Stockbridge an “aggrieved party” such that it is entitled to
appellate relief.  
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the portion of
the District Court’s order and opinion denying Stockbridge’s
Rule 19 motion.
